The key tool in proving inexpressibility results in finite-model theory is Ehrenfeucht-F'rai'ss6 games. This paper surveys various game-theoretic techniques and tools that lead to simpler proofs of inexpressibility results. The focus is on first-order logic and monadic NP.
Introduction
The computational complexity of a problem is the amount of resources, such as time or space, required by a machine that solves the problem. Complexity theory traditionally has focused on the computational complexity of problems.
A more recent branch of complexity theory focuses on the descriptive complexity of problems, which is the complexity of describing problems in some logical formalism [Imm89] . One of the exciting developments in complexity theory is the discovery of a very intimate connection between computational and descriptive complexity. In particular, the author showed [Fag741 that the complexity class N P coincides with the class of properties of finite structures expressible in existential second-order logic, otherwise known as C:. Because of this connection, a potential method of proving lower bounds in complexity theory is to prove inexpressibility results in the corresponding logic.
This issue of expressive power is fundamental in mathematical logic:
given a class C of sentences and a class M of structures, we wish to know which properties S can be expressed by the sentences in C about the structures in M . For example, let C be the class of all first-order @ 1997 American Mathematical Society 1 sentences, let M be the class of all finite graphs, and let the property S be connectivity: then the question is whether there is a first-order sentence that is true about all finite graphs that are connected, but false about all finite graphs that are not connected (in this case, the answer is "No" [Fag75] ).
We are interested in both positive results (which say that certain properties can be expressed) and negative results (which say that certain properties cannot be expressed). To prove a positive result, it is sufficient to exhibit a specific sentence in C and prove that this sentence expresses the property S over the given class M of structures. This is usually not very difficult. On the other hand, to prove a negative result, it is necessary to prove that there does not exist a sentence in C that expresses the property over M . Since C is usually infinite, this means that the proof must simultaneously show that none of an infinite class of sentences "works". This is often a daunting task.
Fortunately, logicians have various tools in their arsenal to assist in proving inexpressibility results. These include the Compactness Theorem [End72], the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem [End721 , and Ehrenfeucht-F'rai'ssk games [EhrGl, F'ra541. If the class M consists only of finite structures (which is our main interest in this paper), then Ehrenfeucht-F'rai'ss6 games are the only major tool available. (For some discussion on the failure of standard theorems in logic in the case of finite structures, see [Fag93, Gur84, GurSO] .) The purpose of this paper is to discuss some results and techniques that assist in the use of Ehrenfeucht-Frai'ss6 games, and in particular that make the task of proving inexpressibility results easier.
There are several reasons why it is desirable to develop techniques that make the task of proving inexpressibility results easier. The first reason is to provide simpler proofs for inexpressibility results that are already known. This makes such results more understandable and accessible. The second reason is to make it possible to prove new and deeper inexpressibility results. Our hope is that we can develop such a powerful toolkit that we can eventually make a serious assault on such fundamental problems as the question of whether N P = co-NP. The development of new techniques can often accomplish both goals (of providing simpler proofs for known results, and of obtaining new results). For example, when an easier proof was given in [FSV95] for the result of [Fag751 that connectivity is not in monadic N P (which is defined shortly), this approach was used to show that the result remains true even in the presence of a larger class of built-in relations than was known before.
There are two classes C of sentences that we focus on here. The first consists of sentences in first-order logic: these are the primary sentences of interest in mathematical logic. The second class, which we shall discuss in more detail later, consists of sentences of the form 3A1 ... 3Ak$, where each Ai is a unary relation symbol and where $ is first-order. These are called monadic C: sentences, or monadic NP sentences [FSV95] .
In Section 2, we give definitions and conventions. In Section 3, we discuss various sufficient conditions for the duplicator to have a winning strategy in a first-order Ehrenfeucht-F'ra'iss6 game (played over two structures). These include Hanf's condition, as given by Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi [FSV95] (Section 3.1), Arora and Fagin's condition [AF94] (Section 3.2, and Schwentick's condition [Sch94] (Section 3.3). These three conditions are compared in Section 3.4. Roughly speaking, we could say that Hanf's condition requires isomorphic neighborhoods in the two structures; Arora and Fagin's condition requires approximately isomorphic neighborhoods in the two structures, along with other assumptions (such as that there be no small cycles); and Schwentick's condition requires that the structures be isomorphic, except in some small parts. In Section 4, we discuss techniques for proving inexpressibility results in monadic NP, such as , where the rules are changed to help the duplicator. Some examples of the use of these techniques are given in Section 5. In Section 6, we make some additional comments. We give our conclusions in Section 7.
Definitions and conventions
A language C (sometimes called a similarity type, a signature, or a vocabulary) is a finite set { P I , . . . , Pp} of relation symbols, each of which has an arity, along with a finite set {el, . . . , c z } of constant symbols. An C-structure (or structure over C, or structure of similarity type C , or simply structure) is a set A (called the universe), along with a mapping associating a relation R, over A with each Pi E C, where R, has the same arity as Pi, for 1 5 i 5 p , and associating a member of A with each constant symbql ci 6 L, for 1 5 i 5 d. We may call Ri the interpretation of pi (and similarly for the constant symbols). If the point a is the interpretation of the constant symbol G, then we may say that a is labeled ci. The structure is called finite if A is.
We take a "graph' to be a structure where the language consists of a single binary relation symbol. Sometimes, such as in dealing with the reachability' problem, it is useful to take some liberties with standard terminology, by taking a "graph" to mean a directed graph with two distinguished points, labeled s and t respectively: then a graph is a structure where the language consists of a single binary relation symbol and two constant symbols, s and t. We are also interested in "colored graphs", which are structures where the language includes also some finite number of unary relation symbols. If G is a colored graph, where the interpretations of the unary relation symbols in the language are U1,. . . , u k , then by the color of a point a in the universe of G, we mean the set of 2's such that a E Ui. Thus, there are 2k colors.
Let G be an L-structure, and let X be a subset of the universe of G.
We write G 1 X for the substructure of G induced by X . ' The reachability (or "(s, t)-connectivity" ) problem is the problem of deciding, given a graph and two distinguished vertices s and t in it, whether there is a path from s to t. In the case of directed graphs, the problem is called the directed reachability problem.
case of finite-model theory, where we restrict our attention to finite structures, "connectivity" would refer to the class of finite connected graphs.) We write s for M \ S, the complement of S in M . Let 
First-order games
In this section, we focus on first-order Ehrenfeucht-Fraiss6 games, and give three sufficient conditions for one player (the duplicator) to win. These conditions are based on techniques of Hanf [Han65] (and given a new interpretation by Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi [FSV95] ), Arora and Fagin [AF94] , and Schwentick [Sch94] . As we shall discuss, such techniques and conditions are valuable tools for obtaining inexpressibility results.
We begin with an informal definition of an r-round first-order Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse' game (where T is a positive integer), which we shall call an r-game for short. It is straightforward to give a formal definition, but we shall not do so. There are two players, called the spoiler and the duplicator, and two structures, Go and GI. In the first round, the spoiler selects a point in one of the two structures, and the duplicator selects a point in the other structure. Let p1 be the point selected in Go, and let q1 be the point selected in G1. Then the second round begins, and again, the spoiler selects a point in one of the two structures, and the duplicator selects a point in the other structure. Let p2 be the point selected in Go, and let q2 be the point selected in GI. This continues for r rounds. We see from Theorem 3.2 that to prove first-order inexpressibility, we would like tools for showing that the duplicator has a winning strategy in an r-game. As we shall see, such tools are also valuable as a step in proving inexpressibility in richer logics, such as monadic NP.
We now discuss three sufficient conditions for the duplicator to have a winning strategy in an r-game, that is, for showing that Go N~ G1 for two structures Go, GI. Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi [FSV95] provide a simple but very useful sufficient condition for guaranteeing that Go -r G1 for two structures Go, GI. The proof is based on a technique of Hanf [Han65] . They used this condition as a part of a simple proof that connectivity is not in monadic N P (much simpler than the author's original proof [Fag75]).
Hanf's condition
Let G be an L-structure, where L consists of the relation symbols PI,. . . , Pp, possibly along with some constant symbols c1,. . . , c,, and where R, is the interpretation in G of the relation symbol Pi, for 1 5 i 5 p. The Gaifman graph [Gai82] of G is the undirected graph with the same universe as G, and with an edge ( z 1 ,~) whenever z1 and z2 are distinct and appear together in a tuple of some relation of G. Let a and b be two points in (the universe of) G. We say that a and b are adjacent (in G) if either a = b, or ( a , b) is an edge of the Gaifman graph of G. Intuitively, two points a and b are adjacent if they are either identical or directly related by some relation of G. The degree of a point in G is defined to be the degree in the Gaifman graph of G.
Define Ball(a, k), the ball of radius k about a, recursively as follows: , there are no constant symbols. If there are z constant symbols, then we would take d = 3Tcz-1, since, intuitively, z constant symbols effectively increase the number of rounds by z (OUT definition of a winning strategy for the duplicator assumes effectively that there are "t extra rounds" where the points that are interpretations of the z constant symbols are selected). A similar comment applies to the estimates following Theorems 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8.
Fagin
We now give a simple example of the use of Hanf's condition, to show that connectivity is not first-order. We remark that this example is sufficiently simple that each of the three conditions (Hanf's, AroraFagin's, and Schwentick's) that we consider in this paper can prove this result. We make use here of Hanf's condition. By Theorem 3.2, we need only show that for each r , there is a graph Go that is connected and a graph G1 that is not connected, such that Go -, GI. Given r , find d as in Theorem 3.3. Let Go be a cycle with 4d nodes, and let G1 be the disjoint union of two cycles, each with 2d nodes. It is easy to see that every point in Go and G1 has the same d-type. Since Go and G1 have the same number of points, and all with the same d-type, it follows that Go and GI are d-equivalent. By Theorem 3.3 and our choice of d, it follows that Go -, GI, which was to be shown. Later, in On the face of it, the assumptions of Theorem 3.4 are stronger than those of Theorem 3.3, since the assumptions of Theorem 3.4 demand that each vertex have the same d-type in Go as in GI, rather than simply requiring that for each d-type r, the structures Go and G1 have the same number of vertices of d-type r. However, we can apply Theorem 3.4 whenever we could apply Theorem 3.3, by simply replacing G1 by an isomorphic copy of G1 (with the same set of vertices as Go, and with each vertex having the same d-type in Go as in GI).
The condition in Theorem 3.3 (that the two structures are dequivalent for some large d) is sufficiently strong that it can be used to obtain indistinguishability results not just in first-order logic, but in stronger logics, as we now discuss. Let us write Go w, G1 if it happens that not only does the duplicator have a winning strategy in the rgame over Go, GI, but also the duplicator's strategy in each round is bijective. This means that for each i (with 0 5 i 5 1--1) and each choice of p l , q l , . . . ,pi, qi (where, intuitively, p j is the point chosen in Go in round j, and qj is the point chosen in GI in round j), there is a bijection f from the universe of Go to the universe of GI, such that 1. if the spoiler selects pi+l in Go in round i + 1, then the duplicator selects f (pi+l) in GI in round i + 1, and 2. if the spoiler selects qi+1 in GI in round i + 1, then the duplicator selects f-l(qi+l) in Go in round i + 1.
When the duplicator's strategy in each round is bijective, then we say that the duplicator has a bijective strategy. By a result of Hella [He192] , the duplicator's having a bijective winning strategy is sufficient to imply inexpressibility in first-order logic extended by unary generalized quantifiers4 Thus, Hella's result is the following analogue to Theorem 3.2. Unlike Theorem 3.2, this theorem gives only a sufficient condition, not a necessary and sufficient condition. 
We note that Hella defines the Ehrenfeucht-Frai'ssk game for unary generalized quantifiers slightly differently from how we do. Rather than simply requiring that the duplicator have a bijective strategy, as we do, Hella requires the duplicator to exhibit the bijection in each round before the spoiler makes his move. Hella's requirement does not change the notion of x T . Immerman and Lander [IL90] defined a game, which we shall call the "counting game". The rules of the r-round counting game are as follows. On round i (for 1 5 i 5 r ) , the spoiler selects a set of points in one structure, and the duplicator must respond with a set of points of the same cardinality in the other structure. Then the spoiler selects a point in the set chosen by the duplicator, and the duplicator selects a point in the set chosen by the spoiler. Let pi be the point selected in Go, and let qi be the point selected in G1. As before, the duplicator wins if the substructure of Go induced by p l , . . . , p, is isomorphic to the substructure of G1 induced by q l , . . . , q,, under the function that maps pi onto qi for 1 5 i 5 T .
4See [He1921 for the definition of unary generalized quantifiers. With unary generalized quantifiers, it is possible to express sentences like "there are an even number of points x such that P x holds" and "the number of points x where P x holds is less than the number of points y where Qy holds".
It is clear that if the duplicator has a bijective winning strategy in the (first-order) r-game, then he also has a winning strategy in the Tround counting game: the duplicator responds to moves of the spoiler by using his bijection, in an obvious way. (For example, if f is the bijection in round i between the universe of Go and the universe of GI, and if in round i the spoiler selects the set S , which is a subset of the universe of Go, then the duplicator responds by selecting {f(x) I x E S } as his chosen subset of the universe of GI.) What is not so clear (but is true) is that the converse also holds.5 Thus, the duplicator has a winning strategy in the r-round counting game over Go,G1 iff Go M, GI.
Nurmonen [Nur96] showed the following strengthening of Theorem 3.3. Theorem 3.6 [Nur96] Let r be a positive integer. There is a positive integer d such that whenever Go and G1 are d-equivalent structures, then Go M, GI.
In fact, as shown in [Nur96] , we can take d = 3' in Theorem 3.6.
Etessami [Ete95] considered the following problem of defining an order: in a structure with a successor relation and constant symbols s and t, does s precede t? He proved that order is not expressible in firstorder logic extended by unary generalized quantifiers, in the presence of a built-in successor relation.6 His proof proceeds as follows.
Define two graphs Go and GI, each of which are long chains, where the (i + 1)st point in the chain is the successor of the ith point in the chain. In the graph Go, the point labeled s precedes the point labeled t , and in GI, the opposite is true. The graph Go has a long stretch of points, followed by s, followed by another long stretch, followed by t, followed by another long stretch; and similarly for G1, with the roles of s and t reversed. Etessami makes use of the counting game, and gives a long, involved proof that the duplicator has a winning strategy. The inexpressibility result then follows. ' The fact that the duplicator has a bijective winning strategy in the r-game iff he has a winning strategy in the r-round counting game was apparently fist noted by Hella (personal communication) . It is not hard to see that the equivalence of the two games follows from Observation 5.3 in [CFI92] . The equivalence is noted in the full version of [He192], but only for the w-round version.
6Actually, Etessami stated his-result by saying that order is not expressible in "first-order logic with counting" in the presence of a built-in successor relation, but his proof amounts to essentially the same thing.
Instead of Etessami's long proof, we now show that it is simple to use Theorem 3.6 to show that for each T , there is a pair Go, G1 as above such that Go M , GI. Etessami's result then follows immediately from Theorem 3.5. By Theorem 3.6, we need only show that for each d, there is a pair Go, G1 as above such that Go and G1 are d-equivalent. Let Go have universe { 1,. . . , 3 d -l}, where the interpretation of the successor relation is the usual successor relation restricted to { 1, . . . ,3d -l}, where the interpretation of s is the point d, and where the interpretation o f t is the point 2d. Thus, intuitively, Go consists of a chain, with d -1 points, followed by s, followed by d -1 more points, followed by t , followed by d -1 more points. We define G1 the same, except that we reverse s and t , so that t precedes s. In each structure, a d-type consists of a sequence of points, where one of the points in the sequence may be labeled by s or t. It is easy to see that for every d-type, Go and G1 have exactly the same number of points with that d-type. That is, Go and G1 are d-equivalent, which was to be shown.
Although Theorem 3.3 is sufficient for their purposes, Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi actually prove a slightly stronger version of this theorem. Instead of demanding that Go and G1 be d-equivalent (that is, for each d-type r , have exactly the same number of points with dtype r ) , they show that it is sufficient instead to require only that for every d-type r , either Go and G1 have the same number of points with d-type r , or else both have at least m points with d-type r (for some large m that depends only on the number T of rounds and the maximal degree of any point in Go and GI). Intuitively, this latter condition says that for each d-type r , the structures Go and G1 have the same number of points with d-type r , where we can count only as high as m. Thomas [Tho911 proves a similar result. Theorem 3.3 is also related to a result by Gaifman [Gai82] , who proved that in a precise sense, first-order logic talks only about neighborhoods. Arora and Fagin [AF94] introduced another sufficient condition for guaranteeing that Go -T G1 for two structures Go,G1. They used their condition as a part of a proof that directed reachability is not in monadic N P (much simpler than Ajtai and Fagin's original proof [AF90] of this result). Intuitively, their condition requires a weaker local isomorphism than does the Hanf condition, but at the expense of extra assumptions (such as that there are no small cycles).
Arora and Fagin's condition

Fagin
Before we can state the theorem, we need to define the notions of a cycle in a structure and of the (r, k)-color of a vertex in a structure. In the case of (colored) graphs, a cycle is the usual notion of an undirected cycle, where we ignore the directions of the edges. The definition in the case of general structures is more complicated, and we defer it till later. The definition of the (r,k)-color is also simpler in the case of colored graphs, and we give it now; later we give the definition in the general case. We note that the case of colored graphs is what is needed when using Arora and Fagin's condition as a "subroutine" in proving that some graph property is not in monadic NP.
Let T and k be integers, and let G be a colored graph. We now define the notion of the (T, k)-color of each vertex in G. The next theorem gives Arora and Fagin's sufficient condition for the duplicator to have a winning strategy in the r-game over structures Go, G1. A good example of where the Arora-Fagin condition might be applicable but the Hanf condition might not is when Go is a graph and G1 is the result of deleting one edge of Go (this situation arises in the proof that directed reachability is not in monadic NP; see Example 2 of Section 5). In this example, the d-type in Go of each of the endpoints of the edge that is deleted to form GI would typically not be a d-type of any point of GI.
Arora and Fagin also give a strengthening of Theorem 3.7, in which small cycles are allowed under certain circumstances. They use the strengthened version to deal with inexpressibility in the presence of certain built-in relations.
In the remainder of this subsection, we give definitions of "cycle" and " ( T , k)-color" for structures G that are not necessarily graphs. This (somewhat technical) material can be skipped by those interested only in the case of graphs.
If t = ( x l , . . . , x k ) is a tuple, define [t] to be the set ( 5 1 , . . . , z k } of points that appear in t. Define the hypergraph associated with structure G to be a hypergraph ( V , F ) whose universe V is the same as the universe of G and whose set F of (hyper)edges is
{ [ t ]
: t is a tuple in some relation of G} .
A (sample) path of length k between two points u , u of G consists of a set of edges S1, . . . , SIC E F and a set of points z1,. . . , Xk-1 E V such that (i) the xi's are distinct from each other and from u and v, (ii) Fagin u E 5'1) (iii) v E Sk) and (iv) xi E Si n Si+l, for 1 5 i < k. The distance between distinct points u and v is the smallest k such that there is a path of length k between them, and the distance between a point and itself is 0. In particular, an alternate way to define BaZZ(a,k) in Section 3.1 is to take BaZZ(a, k ) to be all points whose distance from a is at most k . If k 2 3, then a cycle of length k in a structure G is a path of length k from a vertex to itself. (Shortly, we shall mention why cycles of length 1 or 2 are not considered.) Except for the fact that cycles of length 2 are not considered, this definition corresponds to Berge's notion [Ber76] of a cycle in a hypergraph. (There are various other notions of a cycle in a hypergraph that are not equivalent to Berge's;
see [Fag83] .) Note that if G is a structure over a language with a single binary relation) then its hypergraph is an ordinary undirected graph, and the concept of distance and cycle are the familiar ones.
The notions of a cycle in structure G and a cycle in the Gaifman graph of G are different in general. For example, if there is a tuple (XI, x2, x3) in a ternary relation of a structure G with all entries distinct, then there is a cycle of length 3 in the Gaifman graph (with edges ( X I , Q), (Q, 2 3 ) ) and (x3, xl)), but not necessarily a cycle in G. In general, a cycle in a structure gives rise to a cycle in the Gaifman graph, but not vice versa. Note that an assumption of Theorem 3.7 is that there are no small cycles in the structure. Thus, the fact that the notion of "cycle') we have given is restrictive only increases the applicability of Theorem 3.7. This is also why cycles of length less than 3 are not considered; such very small cycles would have no effect on the theorem, and so we do not want to forbid them.
We now discuss how to define the (r,k) N(H0, k) and N ( H 1 , k) if he has a winning strategy in the r-game over N (Ho, k) , N ( H I , k) such that whenever pi (resp., qi) is the point picked in round i in N(H0, k) (resp., N(H1, k) 
there is a distance-preserving isomorphism from
Go -Ho to GIIn fact, as shown in [Sch94] , we can take k = 2T in Theorem 3.8.
As we noted earlier, Schwentick's condition (like Hanf's, and AroraFagin's) can be used to prove that connectivity is not first-order, by considering one cycle versus two cycles. We now show how, and note how the result can be strengthened. As before, by Theorem 3.2 we need only show that for each r , there is a graph Go that is connected and a graph G1 that is not connected, such that Go mT GI. Given T , find k as in Theorem 3.8. Let Go be a cycle with 4k + 4 nodes, and let G1 be the disjoint union of two cycles, each with 2k + 2 nodes. Let HO be the subgraph of Go that contains two nodes that are as far apart as possible. Let HI be the subgraph of G1 that contains two nodes that are in different cycles. It is easy to see that the conditions of Theorem 3.8 are satisfied. Hence Go wT GI, which was to be shown. In [Sch95] , Schwentick shows how to extend this argument (again, by using only Schwentick presents several variations of his condition, that get increasingly powerful, but, unfortunately, also increasingly hard to understand. The most powerful (and hardest to understand) variation is used to prove his key result, that connectivity is not in monadic NP, even in the presence of a built-in linear order. At the end of this subsection, we comment on the idea behind how Theorem 3.8 must be modified to deal with a built-in linear order. Some modification is clearly required, since in the presence of a built-in linear order, each point has distance at most one from every other point. See [Sch95, Sch96] for other applications of Schwentick's method. Fortunately, the underlying proof of each of Schwentick's variations is essentially identical, and is elegant and easy to understand.
Schwentick's argument is as follows.
At the beginning of the game we view the vertices in Ho and HI as inner vertices, and the vertices outside of BaZZ(Ho,2') and BaZZ(H1,2') as outer vertices. The other vertices are considered to be in a buffer area. The boundaries of the inner vertices and of the outer vertices may change on each round. Note that at the beginning of the game, the distance from every inner vertex to every outer vertex is greater than 2' .
What the duplicator does in a given round depends on whether the spoiler selects an inner vertex, an outer vertex, or a vertex in the buffer area. If the spoiler selects an inner vertex, then the duplicator responds, based on his winning strategy on the inner vertices. If the spoiler selects an outer vertex, then the duplicator responds, based on the isomorphism. If the spoiler selects a vertex in the buffer area, then there are two possibilities, depending on whether the vertex is closer to the inner vertices or the outer vertices. Assume without loss of generality that the spoiler selects vertex p in Go. Let D be the distance from p to the inner vertices, that is, the minimum of d ( p , x) where x is an inner vertex of Go. It is straightforward to show, by induction on i, that after round i, the distance from every outer vertex to every inner vertex is more than 2r--i . In particular, at the end of the game, no inner vertex is adjacent to any outer vertex. The duplicator wins the game, since (a) the substructure induced by vertices chosen during the game that are contained in the final set of inner vertices of Go is isomorphic to the analogous substructure in GI; (b) the substructure induced by vertices chosen during the game that are contained in the final set of outer vertices of Go is isomorphic to the analogous substructure in GI; and (c) there are no edges between the final set of inner vertices and the final set of outer vertices. This concludes the proof.
We close this subsection by giving the idea behind how Schwentick extends Theorem 3.8 to prove that connectivity is not in monadic NP, even in the presence of a built-in linear order. What we shall explain is not quite enough to prove this result, but at least it gives the proper i n t~i t i o n .~ We take Go and GI in Theorem 3.8 to be structures that involve not only the graph relation but also the (built-in) linear ordering relation. The distance between two points is taken to be the distance using only the graph relation (and thus ignoring the linear ordering relation). This way, it is no longer the case that each point necessarily has distance at most one from every other point. A third condition is added to the two conditions of Theorem 3.8. This third condition is a homogeneity condition, which says that if x and y are points of GO such that the distance d(z,Ho) is less than the distance d(y,Ho), then J: is less than y in the linear order (of course, we assume also that the symmetric condition holds for GI). In particular, the points in Ho form an initial segment of the linear order in Go (and similarly for HI in GI). Once again, essentially the same proof shows that Go mT GI.
The third condition ensures that in both graphs, after the game every inner vertex is less than every outer vertex in the linear order.
'The extension we now describe does not appear as such in any of Schwentick's papers.
Schwentick mentioned this extension to the author in it private correspondence.
Comparison of the approaches
In this subsection, we discuss and compare the three sufficient conditions we have seen (Theorems 3.3, 3.7, and 3.8 and their  variations) for the duplicator to have a winning strategy in a first-order game.
We begin by noting that the three conditions are incomparable: for each of the three conditions, there are situations where it can be applied but the other two cannot. Each corresponds to a different "reason)' why the duplicator has a winning strategy, Let us compare the Hanf condition (in the variation given by Theorem 3.4) with the Arora-Fagin condition (Theorem 3.7). We see that the assumptions of both theorems require that Go and GI have the same set of vertices. The Hanf condition requires isomorphic neighborhoods, whereas the Arora-Fagin condition requires only "approximately isomorphic neighborhoods" (by dealing only with ( T , k)-colors, rather than isomorphism types). But the Arora-Fagin condition requires additional assumptions (such as that there be no small cycles). Just after the statement of Theorem 3.7, we mentioned an example where the Arora-Fagin condition is applicable but the Hanf condition is not. Schwentick's condition requires even a stronger type of isomorphism than either the Hanf condition or the Arora-Fagin condition. Intuitively, Schwentick's condition requires that the structures be isomorphic, except in some small parts.
Historically, the importance of Schwentick's approach is that it is the first to be able to deal with a built-in linear order (this requires the strongest of Schwentick's variations). As we noted earlier, the Hanf condition and the Arora-Fagin condition cannot be applied in this case, since all of the vertices are in a ball of radius one.
We recommend that in applying Schwentick's approach, his underlying proof technique, as discussed in Section 3.3, be used rather than his theorems (except for the simplest variation, namely Theorem 3.8, and the unpublished extension mentioned at the end of Section 3.3). This is because, as we discussed, the stronger variations of his condition are hard to understand, whereas the proof technique is simple and elegant. By contrast, in applying Hanf's approach or Arora and Fagin's approach, we recommend that the theorems be used directly. This is because the proofs of correctness of these latter two approaches are much harder to understand and apply than the statements of the theorems.
Monadic NP
As mentioned earlier, the complexity class NP coincides with the class of properties of finite structures expressible in existential second-order logic [Fag74] . A consequence of this equivalence is that the famous question in complexity theory as to whether NP=co-NP is equivalent to the question in logic of whether existential and universal secondorder logic have the same expressive power over finite structures, i.e., whether or not C: = II;. Since our best available tool for attacking the question of whether C: = Il: is Ehrenfeucht-Fraissk games, Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi [FSV95] announced a program to build a toolkit of game-theoretic techniques. To help develop the toolkit, we restrict our attention to a "tractable" subclass of C:, called monadic NP. We now give some definitions.
When we pass from first-order logic to second-order logic, we allow quantification over sets and relations. In particular, a C: sentence is a sentence of the form 3A1...3Ak?+h, where ?+h is first-order and where the Ai's are relation symbols. As an example, we now construct a C: sentence that says that a graph (with edge relation denoted by E ) is 3-colorable. In this sentence, the three colors are represented by the unary relation symbols A1, A2, and As. Let $1 say "Each point has exactly one color". Thus, $1 is Let $9 say "No two points with the same color are connected by an edge". Thus, $2 is The C: sentence 3A13A23A3($1 A $2) then says "The graph is 3-colorable" .
A C: sentence 3A1 ... 3Ak$, where $ is first-order, is said to be monadic if each of the Ai's is unary, that is, the existential secondorder quantifiers quantify only over sets. A class S of structures is said to be (monadic) C: if it is the class of all structures (of a given similarity type) that obey some fixed (monadic) C: sentence. When we restrict our attention to finite structures, a (monadic) C: class is also called a (monadic) generalized spectrum. Because of the equivalence between C: and NP, Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi [FSV95] refer to the collection of monadic C: classes (again, when we restrict attention to finite structures) as monadic NP. We often refer to a class of graphs by a defining property, for example, 3-colorability. As we saw above, 3-colorability is in monadic NP.
The author proved the first result about monadic NP, by showing that connectivity is not in monadic N P [Fag75] . We now discuss the original proof, in order to see the difficulties involved. Then we will see how the proof can be simplified by using various tools.
In [Fag75] , the author introduced an Ehrenfeucht-Fraiss6 game corresponding to monadic NP. Let Go, G1 be structures) and let c, r be positive integers (where c represents the number of colors and r the number of rounds). We call this game the (c, r)-game over Go, GI. The rules are as follows.
1. The spoiler colors Go with the c colors.
2.
The duplicator colors G1 with the c colors.
3. The spoiler and duplicator play an r-game on the colored Go, GI.
The winner is decided as before. Of course, the isomorphism must respect colors. Note that unlike the first-order game, the rules are asymmetric in Go, GI, in that the spoiler must color Go. We have the following theorem, analogous to Theorem 3.1. We now sketch how the author used Theorem 4.1 to prove that connectivity is not in monadic NP. Given c,r it was shown that there are cycles CO, C1 such if Go = Co and G1 = Co@Cl (where @ represents the disjoint union) such that the duplicator can win the (c,r)-game over Go,G1. Since Go is connected and G1 is not, this shows that connectivity is not in monadic NP.
The idea of the duplicator's coloring strategy was to color Co in G1 by mimicking the coloring of Go, and to color C1 in a way where every Fagin d-type in Cl appears many times in Co. The duplicator's pebbling strategy (that is, his strategy in the remaining r-game) was given explicitly. We note that for the duplicator's pebbling strategy, we could instead have made use of the extended version of Hanf's condition, mentioned at the end of Section 3.1.
For the sake of future discussions, let us consider what the difficulties are in this original proof. They are:
D1:
The selection of the graphs Go, D2: The duplicator's coloring strategy.
D3:
The duplicator's pebbling strategy.
In addition to considering games over pairs Go,GI of structures, Ajtai and Fagin [AF90] found it convenient, for reasons we shall see shortly, to consider games over a class S. The rules of the game are as follows:
1. The duplicator selects a member of S to be Go, 2. The duplicator selects a member of s to be GI.
3.
The spoiler colors Go with the c colors.
4.
The duplicator colors GI with the c colors.
5. The spoiler and duplicator play an r-game on the colored Go, GI.
We refer to this game as the original (c, r ) game over S (to contrast it with the Ajtai-Fagin (c, r)-game over S, which we shall define shortly).
The next theorem follows easily from Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.2 S is in monadic NP ifl there are c,r such that the spoiler has a winning strategy in the original (c, r)-game over S.
8The issue is what the size of the cycles CO and Cl should be. It is not sufficient that they simply be ''sufficiently large". For example, we leave it to the reader to verify that if CO and C1 are both odd cycles, if Go = CO and G1 = CO @ Cl, and if c 2 2 and r 2 3, then the spoiler has a winning strategy in the (c,r)-game over Go, GI.
Fagin
Examples
In this section, we discuss examples of the use of the techniques we have mentioned.
Example 1: Connectivity. Our first example deals with the proof that connectivity is not in monadic NP. We saw a sketch of the author's original proof in Section 4. We now give a simplified proof by Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi [FSV95] .
Simplified proof: Let S be the class of connected graphs, and let C , T be arbitrary. We now show that the duplicator has a winning strategy in the Ajtai-Fagin (c, r)-game over S. It follows from Theorem 4.3 that S is not in monadic NP.
Let d be given by Theorem 3.3 for this T . The duplicator chooses Go to be a directed cycle of length n, for a sufficiently large n. Let . . , a,-1 denote the points in order around the cycle, so that there is an edge from ai to ai+l for 0 5 i < n. Here and subsequently, subscripts are reduced modulo n to belong to the interval [0, n -11.
The spoiler now colors Go with c colors. Let x(ai) denote the color of ai. Assuming that n 2 2d, the d-type of the point ai in the resulting structure is fully described by the following vector of 2d -1 colors:
The number of possible d-types is some constant, depending on c and d, but not on n. So it is clear that, for n sufficiently large, there must be at least 4d points with the same d-type. Therefore, there must exist points ap and aq that have the same d-type and are at least distance 2d apart (that is, ap @ BaZZ(a,, 2d) ).
The duplicator now forms GI, a pair of disjoint directed cycles, by pinching Go together at the points ap and aq (see Figure 1 ).
More precisely, let GI be a structure with universe consisting of n distinct points Po, PI, . . . , @,-I.
There Let us consider now the three difficulties that we mentioned in Section 4 about the author's original proof, and see how they have been ameliorated by Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi's proof.
The selection of the graphs. In the original proof, the sizes of the cycles had to be carefully selected. In the new proof, we simply pick Go to be a sufficiently large cycle.
D2: The duplicator's coloring strategy. In the new proof, this could not be simpler: the duplicator simply mimics the spoiler's coloring.
D3:
The duplicator's pebbling strategy. In the new proof, we simply appeal to Hanf's condition.
Example 2: Directed reachability. Our second example deals with the proof that directed reachability is not in monadic NP. We sketch the idea of the proof, as given by Arora and Fagin [AF94] , which is a simplification of the proof of Ajtai and Fagin [AF90] .
Sketch of proof: Let S be the class of (s, t)-connected graphs. Let v1,. . . , v, be n points, which are used as the set of vertices of the graph Go. The vertex v1 is labeled s, and the vertex v, is labeled t. Then Go, the member of S selected by the duplicator in the Ajtai-Fagin (c,r)-game over S , has "forward edges" (vi, vi+1) for 1 5 i < n; these form a path from s to t. In addition, Go has certain "backedges" (vi,vj) where j < i . shown probabilistically that for a certain choice of Go and for each coloring of Go by the spoiler, a forward edge e can be selected (also probabilistically) so that if (a) GI is taken to be Go -e , and (b) the duplicator mimics the coloring of Go on G1, then Arora and Fagin's condition (Theorem 3.7) is satisfied. Therefore, the duplicator can win
D1:
the remaining r-game. By Theorem 4.3, this is sufficient to show that directed reachability is not in monadic NP. This concludes the proof. I Again, it is instructive to see why the use of the Ajtai-Fagin (c, r)-game, as opposed to the original (c, r)-game, is important in this proof.
If the spoiler knew which edge e were deleted from Go to form G1 = G-e, this might dramatically influence his coloring of Go (for example, the spoiler might color the endpoints of e with a special color, say red, not used anywhere else). Then the duplicator would not be able to use the strategy of simply mimicking the spoiler's coloring, since there would be an edge between the red nodes in Go but not between the red nodes in G1.
Again, let us consider the three difficulties mentioned earlier, and see how this proof helps bypass them.
The selection of the graphs. In this proof, the graphs are selected by a random procedure, rather than being constructed explicitly. It is shown that with high probability, the duplicator succeeds. Since in particular the probability is nonzero, there exists a winning strategy for the duplicator. This probabilistic approach is potentially very powerful.
The duplicator's coloring strategy. Once again, the duplicator simply mimics the spoiler's coloring.
The duplicator's pebbling strategy. Here we simply appeal to Arora and Fagin's condition.
D2:
D3:
6 Some additional comments Ajtai and Fagin invented the Ajtai-Fagin game because they did not see how to prove that directed reachability is not in monadic N P by using the original game. They posed the question as to whether the same types of graphs they used (a graph Go that is (s, t)-path with backedges, and a graph G1 that is the result of deleting a forward edge e from Go) could have, in principle, been used in the original game to prove the same result. A theorem was proven in [Fag951 that implies that this is indeed the case: in general, the same types of graphs can be used in the original game as in the Ajtai-Fagin game. On the other hand, a more complicated coloring strategy may be required in the original game than the Ajtai-Fzgin game. For example, let us consider Go and GI = Go -e as above. As we noted earlier, in the original game over Fagin these graphs the duplicator cannot simply mimic the spoiler's coloring (as the duplicator did in the Ajtai-Fagin game) . This is because, as we noted, the spoiler can color the endpoints of the edge e with a special color.
Finally, we comment on the fact that in the two proofs we discussed in Section 5 , the duplicator was able to simply mimic the spoiler's coloring. That is, the duplicator has a winning strategy not just in the Ajtai-Fagin game, but in a game where GI is required to be colored just like Go. Not surprisingly, the fact that the duplicator has a winning strategy even when G1 must be colored just like Go corresponds to inexpressibility in a richer logic than that of monadic NP. We now discuss what this richer logic is. Thus, there are 2k colors.
Conclusions
As Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi observe [FSV95] , if we are to make serious progress on resolving difficult problems in computational complexity through using descriptive complexity techniques, we need to develop our descriptive complexity toolkit. Ehrenfeucht-Fkaiss6 games are the current major tools in our arsenal. In this paper, we discuss some steps that have been taken to ease our task in proving descriptive complexity lower bounds.
In looking back at progress in descriptive complexity, one moral that can be drawn is that we should try to use general principles, rather than ad hoc arguments, in proving inexpressibility results. This makes it easier for others to use these techniques in the future. We also suggest that it would be a useful exercise to go back and look at previous inexpressibility results, to see if general principles can be extracted.
